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 1 Introduction
In many markets, trade is facilitated by intermediaries, e.g., dealers, market-makers, spe-
cialists. The degree of market power that these intermediaries have is commonly viewed
as a key determinant of the liquidity of the market in which they operate. Recently, sev-
eral regulations have been introduced to foster competition in ￿nancial markets.1 The
available evidence suggests that these reforms have had an impact on trading costs and
have also a⁄ected the incentives of ￿nancial intermediaries to make markets.
In order to understand precisely how the organization of the market in which an
asset is traded a⁄ects the standard ￿nancial measures of liquidity, we generalize the
search-theoretic model of ￿nancial intermediation of Darrell Du¢ e et al. (2005) (DGP
hereafter) by introducing entry of dealers and a nontrivial choice of asset holdings. (Asset
holdings are restricted to lie in f0;1g in DGP.) These extensions allow us to discuss several
dimensions of market liquidity, such as trading costs, trade volume and execution delays.
Motivated by the recent regulatory changes, we center our analysis around the e⁄ects of
changes in the dealers￿market power.
We ￿nd that a reform which reduces the dealers￿market power can quite naturally
lead to lower trading costs, higher trade volume, and a net entry of dealers, in line
with the evidence provided by James Weston (2000).2 Our model can also generate
multiple steady-state equilibria, suggesting that markets with similar structures may
1See Michael Barclay et al. (1999) and James Weston (2000) for accounts of these regulatory reforms.
2In Table 6, Weston (2000) documents that the 1997 reform in the NASDAQ was accompanied by a
net entry of dealers, higher turnover of stocks and lower spreads.
2di⁄er considerably in terms of their liquidity outcomes.
2 The environment
Time is continuous and goes on forever. There are two types of in￿nitely-lived agents: a
unit measure of investors and a large measure of dealers. There is one asset, one perishable
good called special good, and a general consumption good de￿ned as numØraire. The asset
is durable, perfectly divisible and in ￿xed supply A 2 R+. Each unit of the asset produces
a unit ￿ ow of special good. There is no market for the special good. The numØraire good
is produced and consumed by all agents. The instantaneous utility function of an investor
is "iu(a) + c, where a 2 R+ is the consumption of special goods (which coincides with
the investor￿ s asset holdings), c 2 R is the net consumption of the numØraire good (c < 0
if the investor produces more of the numØraire good than he consumes), and i 2 fL;Hg
indexes an idiosyncratic component, with "L < "H. The function u(a) is continuous and
twice di⁄erentiable, with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. Each investor receives an idiosyncratic
preference shock with Poisson arrival rate ￿. Conditional on the preference shock, the
probability the investor draws preference type i 2 fL;Hg is ￿i, with ￿L+￿H = 1. Dealers￿
instantaneous utility is simply c, their consumption of the numØraire good. Dealers who
choose to participate in the market also incur a ￿ ow cost ￿ > 0 which represents the
ongoing costs of running the dealership. All agents discount at rate r > 0.
Participating dealers have continuous access to a competitive asset market. An in-
vestor can adjust his asset holdings only through a dealer whom he contacts at random
3and bilaterally with Poisson rate ￿. Once they have made contact, the dealer and the
investor negotiate over the quantity of assets that the dealer will acquire on behalf of the
investor and an intermediation fee; they execute the transaction and part ways.
The rate at which investors contact dealers, ￿, is a continuously di⁄erentiable function
of the measure of active dealers in the market, ￿. Investors contact a dealer faster when
the measure of active dealers is larger , i.e., ￿0(￿) > 0. Furthermore, ￿(0) = 0, ￿(1) = 1,
￿(1)=1 = 0 and ￿0(0) = 1. We capture the notion of competition for order ￿ ow by
assuming that the rate at which dealers contact investors, ￿(￿)=￿, is decreasing in ￿.
3 Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to steady-state equilibria where the price of the asset in terms
of the numØraire good, p 2 R+, is constant over time. The value function of an investor
with a preference type i 2 fL;Hg who holds a quantity of assets a, Vi(a), satis￿es
rVi(a) = "iu(a) + ￿￿j [Vj(a) ￿ Vi(a)] + ￿(￿)[Vi(ai) ￿ Vi(a) ￿ p(ai ￿ a) ￿ ￿i (a)];
where fjg = fL;Hgnfig. The investor enjoys a utility ￿ ow "iu(a) from holding portfolio
a. He receives a new preference type with instantaneous probability ￿￿j and enjoys a
capital gain Vj(a) ￿ Vi(a). Upon contacting a dealer, with instantaneous probability
￿(￿), the investor buys ai ￿ a (sells if negative) and pays the dealer an intermediation
fee, ￿i (a) 2 R+. The quantity traded, ai, and the fee, ￿i (a), correspond to the Nash




0) ￿ Vi(a) ￿ p(a
0 ￿ a) ￿ ￿]
1￿￿￿
￿;
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the dealer￿ s bargaining power. After some calculations,
￿ "iu
0 (ai) ￿ rp, ￿ = ￿ if ai > 0, (1)
￿i(a) =
￿ f￿ "i [u(ai) ￿ u(a)] ￿ rp(ai ￿ a)g
r + ￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
; (2)
where ￿ "i =
[r+￿(￿)(1￿￿)]"i+￿￿ "
r+￿+￿(￿)(1￿￿) and ￿ " = ￿L"L+￿H"H. Note that ￿ "iu0 (a) is a weighted average
of current and future expected marginal utilities. The weight on the current marginal
utility decreases with trading delays, 1=￿, and with dealers￿bargaining power, ￿.




f￿L [aH(￿;￿)]nHL + ￿H [aL(￿;￿)]nLHg ￿ ￿ = 0; (3)
where nji denotes the measure of investors with preference type i who hold the quantity
of assets aj, given by








where aH(￿;￿) and aL(￿;￿) are implicitly de￿ned by (1). According to (3) the expected
5net pro￿t of dealers, ￿(￿;￿), must be 0 in equilibrium. The expected ￿ ow revenue of
a dealer equals the expected intermediation fee he earns when he trades for a random
investor, an event which occurs with Poisson rate ￿(￿)=￿.
Finally, p is determined by the market-clearing condition
P
i;j nijai = A, which using
(4), can be written as
￿HaH + ￿LaL = A: (6)
Condition (6) equates the aggregate demand for the asset by investors (the left-hand
side) to the asset supply.
A steady-state equilibrium is a list f(nij);(ai;￿i (￿));￿;pg satisfying (1)￿ (6). It is
easy to show that lim￿!0 ￿(￿;￿) = 1 and lim￿!1 ￿(￿;￿) = ￿￿ for all ￿ > 0. So an
equilibrium with ￿ > 0 exists provided that ￿ > 0.
4 Liquidity and welfare
In order to isolate the direct e⁄ects of changes in the bargaining power, ￿, on the deal-
ers￿incentives to participate in the market from the general equilibrium e⁄ects that
operate through the implied changes in the investors￿asset holdings, we ￿rst assume
















=rA￿ ! ￿ "H=r. Thus, from (2), ￿LH ￿ ￿H(aL) ! 0 (dealers do
6not charge a fee when they sell) and
￿HL ￿ ￿L(aH) !
￿ ("H ￿ "L)A
[r + ￿ + ￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]￿H
:
So for given ￿ the trading cost ￿HL increases with ￿. From (3) the net expected pro￿t




￿A￿￿L ("H ￿ "L)
[r + ￿ + ￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)][￿(￿) + ￿]
￿ ￿:
The function ￿(￿;￿) is strictly decreasing in ￿, so the equilibrium is unique; ￿ is strictly
increasing in ￿ so that d￿=d￿ > 0. This last result implies that ￿HL increases with ￿.
Finally, the total volume of trade, V ￿ ￿(￿)nHL(aH ￿ aL) = A
￿(￿)￿￿L
￿(￿)+￿ , increases with
￿. The following proposition summarizes the e⁄ects of ￿ on the di⁄erent dimensions of
liquidity.
Proposition 1 Assume ￿ ! 0. An increase in dealers￿bargaining power raises trading
costs (￿HL), reduces trading delays (1=￿(￿)) and increases trade volume (V).
Assuming r ￿ 0, steady-state welfare is
X
j2fL;Hg
nHj"jaH ￿ ￿￿. If a planner could
choose the measure of dealers in the market, he would pick the unique ￿￿ that solves
￿0(￿)
￿￿L("H￿"L)
[￿(￿)+￿]2 A = ￿. (It is easy to check that the planner would choose the same
portfolio allocations implied by the equilibrium.) By using ￿(￿￿;￿) = 0 to solve for ￿, the
following proposition shows that the optimal allocation can be implemented provided that
dealers enjoy a degree of market power that gives them enough incentives to participate
in market-making.
7Proposition 2 Assume ￿ ! 0 and r ￿ 0. The constrained-e¢ cient allocation is










Proposition 1 predicts a positive correlation between trading costs and the number of
dealers. This result, however, hinges on the fact that aH and aL become independent
of ￿ as ￿ ! 0. For more general preferences, however, increases in the dealers￿market
power distorts individuals￿asset holdings, which in turn a⁄ects the volume of trade and
the pro￿tability of dealers. The following lemma, immediate from (1), formalizes these
portfolio e⁄ects.
Lemma 1 (i) @aH(￿;￿)=@￿ < 0 and @aL(￿;￿)=@￿ > 0. (ii) If ￿ < 1 then @aH(￿;￿)=@￿ >
0 and @aL(￿;￿)=@￿ < 0.
According to part (i) of Lemma 1 a reduction in ￿ (for given ￿) raises the asset
demand from high-marginal-utility investors and reduces the asset demand from low-
marginal-utility investors. Intuitively, investors put more weight on their current utility
relative to their future expected utility when dealers have less market power. Thus,
all else equal, a reduction in ￿ makes the distribution of portfolios more disperse. But
changes in ￿ also induce changes in ￿. According to part (ii) of Lemma 1 the e⁄ects of
an increase in ￿ on aH and aL are similar to those of a reduction in ￿. As shown in the
8following propositions, these portfolio e⁄ects can have important positive and normative
implications.
Proposition 3 For some parameter values, there are multiple equilibria.
Consider the following parameter values and functional forms: r = 0:1, ￿ = 1, "H = 1,
"L = 0, ￿L = ￿H = 0:5, ￿ = 1:7, A = 1, ￿ = 0:12 and ￿(￿) = 5￿0:9. The ￿rst panel
of Figure 1 plots ￿(￿;￿) as a function of ￿. It shows that there are multiple (three)
steady-state equilibria if ￿ = 0:51. This multiplicity is removed when ￿ is raised to 0:55
￿ only the equilibrium with a high measure of dealers remains￿ or when ￿ is reduced to
0:44￿ only the low equilibrium survives. Thus, a small change in dealers￿market power
can have a dramatic change on market outcomes. The possibility of multiple equilibria
also suggests that markets with identical fundamental structure can exhibit very di⁄erent
equilibrium liquidity properties: an equilibrium with slow execution, wide spreads and
low volume of trade can coexist with another with fast execution, narrow spreads and a
large volume of trade.
Proposition 4 A reduction in dealers￿market power can generate: a reduction of trading
costs, a net entry of dealers, an increase in trade volume and an increase in welfare.
Keeping the investors￿contact rate constant, an increase in ￿ tends to reduce the
dispersion of portfolios. But there is also a general equilibrium e⁄ect according to which
an increase in ￿ can raise ￿ (and the investors￿contact rate), which in turn can increase
the dispersion of portfolios. As shown in the second panel of Figure 1 the direct e⁄ect
9dominates for large values of ￿.3 As a result, the volume of trade (third panel) and the
dealers￿revenue decline, and execution delays increase (fourth panel) with the dealers￿
bargaining power for su¢ ciently high values of ￿. The ￿fth panel shows that intermedia-
tion costs per unit of asset traded (expressed as a proportion of the asset price) increase
with ￿. Thus, provided that ￿ is high enough, a reduction in dealers￿market power im-
proves all dimensions of liquidity: the volume of trade is larger and trades are executed
faster and at a lower cost. Furthermore, a reduction in ￿ can raise welfare according to
the last panel.4
3In the last ￿ve panels of Figure 1 we plot the equilibrium with the highest measure of dealers
whenever there are multiple equilibria.
4In contrast to the linear case of Proposition 2, there is no value of ￿ that implements the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation since dealers￿market power distorts investors￿asset holdings. See Ricardo Lagos and
Guillaume Rocheteau (2006) for further details.
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